ALTERNATE COMMS.: 4RAR

Showing posts with label 4RAR. Show all posts

Friday, December 4, 2009

COMMANDOS UNDER ATTACK

Exclusive - An Australian Army Reserve Special Forces commando unit has been accused of killing 5 Afghan children in an alleged botched raid...But could political cutbacks, and a short sighted defence policy be the real problems?

COMMANDO REGIMENT IN FIRING LINE:
“Chocko’s” and coppers hung out to dry?

By Sasha Uzunov

The Australian Army’s elite reservist unit, 1 Commando Regiment, is being made a scapegoat over allegations of misconduct in Afghanistan, a former unit member has told TEAM UZUNOV.

The experienced ex-Commando said that he was deeply concerned over claims that poorly trained and led members had breached rules of engagement during a raid on house in Afghanistan which resulted in the deaths of 5 local children after grenades had been thrown last February.

“My concern is the unit has been left out to dry by the Defence Department even before judgement has been passed. Let due process of law take place,” he said. “If people were innocent then that should be shouted from the rooftops but if people were guilty then throw the book at them.”

“Whatever the outcome of the investigation, the responsibility is with the government of the day as well Defence Department bureaucrats. It is they who send troops to war.”

The ex-Commando spent over 20 years with the Sydney based 1 Commando Regiment (1 Cdo Regt) and served in Papua New Guinea, East Timor and the Middle-East.

The unit, he says, consists of a core full time staff, complimented by highly trained reservists from all walks of life. He revealed that there was a high percentage of New South Wales and Victorian Police officers within the ranks.

“The coppers are little group of their own and unfortunately some people see them as a law unto themselves. But that’s not their fault as these guys work together in civilian life as well,” he said.

The ex-Commando laughed at a report in The Age and Sydney Morning Herald newspapers by “defence reporter” Jonathan Pearlman who wrote :

Link: www.smh.com.au/national/soldiers-may-be-first-to-face-charges-for-combat-since-vietnam-20091204-kaxw.html?skin=text-only

“The Herald/Age understands that some of the soldiers in the sub-unit were reservists who worked as police in Australia and that questions have been raised about the possibility they were not properly trained in military procedures for entering houses.”

The ex-1 Cdo Regt soldier said there was no great major difference between a military and a police procedure for a room clearance. “I’m sure the coppers would’ve picked it within a few seconds of training.”

Traditionally a fierce rivalry has existed between the Australian Regular Army (ARA) and the Army Reserve (Ares). Reservists are known as “chocolate soldiers” or “chockos” for allegedly not being able to withstand combat and melt under pressure.

Some Regular soldiers and officers see the reservists as allegedly incompetent or as “weekend warriors.” Some reservists regard their full time colleagues as “lifers” unable to think outside the box.

1 Cdo Regt has its headquarters in Randwick, Sydney and consists of 1 Commando Company in Sydney and 2 Commando Company, in Williamstown, Melbourne, Victoria.

The unit belongs to the Australian Army’s Special Operations Command together with the Perth based regular army Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) and Sydney-based regular army 2nd Commando Regiment (formerly 4 RAR – Commando).

The ex-Commando said if the politicians and media were not happy with reservists in Afghanistan “then don’t send them.”

As revealed in an earlier TEAM UZUNOV story in 2008:

Link: http://teamuzunovmedia.blogspot.com/2008/09/failed-nelson-howard-doctrine-on.html

The legacy of the Nelson-Howard military doctrine has the Special Forces doing most of the fighting, because of the fear of casualties to our regular infantry units. The long term effect could be burn out of our full time Special Forces.

SF BURN OUT?

"Twice now we have had to deploy special forces in Afghanistan and twice now we have had to withdraw them because they are too tired," said Neil James, of think tank the Australian Defence Association in October 2006.

The highly respected Brigadier Jeff Sengelman DSC CSC, deputy commander of Special Operations, revealed the SAS had faced problems with recruiting and retaining soldiers but put a positive spin by also saying that it did not affect its operational capability.

In fact Australian Defence policy over the past 20 years, including that of the current Rudd Federal government, has been to fight wars by the seat of our pants by listening to desk-bound defence theorists and their crazy ideas.

EAST TIMOR CRAZINESS

The farsighted actions of an unheralded Australian Army General saved the lives of Australian soldiers in East Timor.

There is enormous respect for the popular commander of the successful Timor mission (INTERFET) Australian Army General Peter Cosgrove and he deserved to be recognized.
But we must also acknowledge the actions of then Chief of the Australian Army Lieutenant General Frank Hickling.

The Interfet Mission led by Australia intervened in East Timor to avert a catastrophe after the tiny Southeast Asian land had declared its independence from Indonesia in August 1999.

Pro-Indonesian Timorese militia groups supported by Indonesian Special Forces, Kopassus, went on a murderous rampage against independence supporters and later international peacekeepers.

Interfet then handed over control to the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) in January 2000, and the Australian media believed the militia had been defeated. But the militia was simply biding its time and waiting to strike at what it thought was a soft target, Australian Army reservists.

Legendary infantry battalion 6RAR from Brisbane would be the next to go to Timor. It had, over the past decade, been gutted by cost cutting by defence experts. 6RAR had to be rebuilt with reservists grabbed from other units around Australia.

When 6RAR arrived in East Timor in early 2000 it came under ferocious militia attack but held its own.

In 1998, a year before East Timor erupted, the far-sighted Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, a combat engineer who saw action in Vietnam, went from unit to unit ordering his senior commanders that he wanted all full time and reserve soldiers to sharpen up their war fighting skills.

He was concerned that the army’s combat troops had gone soft because of the focus on peacekeeping missions. It was his foresight that kept Australian soldiers, both regular and reservist, alive on the battlefield in Timor despite the cutbacks from the bureaucrats.

The brutal murder and later mutilation of New Zealand soldier Private Leonard Manning by militia in July 2000 was a signal of what the militia had in store for Australian and international soldiers.

(end)

Friday, August 28, 2009

CLINTON AND EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE

10th anniverary of East Timor independence vote - 30 August 2009

ON LINE OPINION - Australia's e-journal of social and political

debate

www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=9366&page=0

Should Clinton get the Nobel Peace Prize for Timor?
By Sasha Uzunov - Friday, 28 August 2009

August 30 will mark the tenth anniversary of East Timor’s successful vote for independence from Indonesia after 24 years of brutal Indonesian rule. Is former United States President Bill Clinton deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize for stopping a genocide at the hands of the Indonesian military against the Timorese people?

In the lead up and in the aftermath of the historic United Nations sponsored referendum in East Timor, pro-Indonesian Timorese militia groups went on a murderous rampage at the behest of the Indonesian authorities.

The Clinton Administration was so concerned that on February 22, 1999, US Assistant Secretary of State, Stanley Roth told Australian diplomat Dr Ashton Calvert that a peacekeeping mission was unavoidable in East Timor. Dr Calvert speaking on behalf of the Australia’s Federal government said the Timorese had to sort it out themselves, in effect they were on their own.

Roth then called Australia’s reluctance to get involved as being “defeatist”. A case of Clinton tough love!

On March 7 Australia’s haughty Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, denied that it was official Indonesian government policy to support the militia groups. “But there may be some rogue elements within the armed forces who are providing arms of one kind or another to pro-integrationists who have been, you know, fighting for the cause of Indonesia,” he said.

In late September 1999, Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard sent in the troops as part of the Interfet Mission but the pretence was that our soldiers were simply keeping apart the two warring “Timorese” factions, those who wanted to stay within Indonesia and those who wanted independence.

But we now know that there was a secret war in East Timor with the Indonesian Army’s (TNI) Special Forces, the dreaded Kopassus, dressed up and pretending to be militia and attacking and killing Timorese civilians and later Australian and New Zealand soldiers.

Defence Department bureaucrat and former Fairfax journalist, Hugh White, revealed that Australia’s involvement in East Timor succeeded because of the Indonesian military’s reluctance to fight a full scale war. This is rather disingenuous. You do not find the Taliban in Afghanistan declaring a full scale war but resorting to guerilla tactics of hit and run and ambushing.

Kopassus’s objective was to inflict as many casualties on Australians and New Zealanders in the hope that their respective governments would withdraw. The Howard government used the elite Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), whose mission is normally to go behind enemy lines to gather information, in a war fighting role.

But Kopassus was not stupid because it had received training from the SASR in the late 1980s and focused on hitting the regular infantry battalions that had deployed to Timor as part of the Interfet mission: airborne infantry unit, 3RAR (Parachute), 2RAR from Townsville and 5/7RAR(Mechanised) from Darwin. In October 1999, a hundred soldiers from Charlie Company, 2RAR, were involved in the biggest shootout since the Vietnam War at a place called Motaain, close to the town of Batugade and on the Indonesian border. It was only the cool thinking of a junior commander Lance Corporal Paul Teong who helped to avert a bloodbath.

The Interfet Mission then handed over control to the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) in January 2000, and the Australian media believed the militia had been defeated. But the militia was simply biding its time and waiting to strike at what it thought was a soft target, Australian Army reservists.

Legendary infantry battalion 6RAR from Brisbane would be the next to go to Timor. It had, over the past decade, been gutted by the cost cutting of White and another defence expert, Paul Dibb, Neither have ever served in uniform. 6RAR had to be rebuilt with reservists grabbed from other units around Australia, including reserve unit 5/6 RVR, Melbourne’s own infantry battalion. When 6RAR arrived in East Timor in early 2000 it came under ferocious militia attack but held its own.

In 1998, a year before East Timor erupted, the far-sighted Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutentant General Frank Hickling, a combat engineer who saw action in Vietnam, went from unit to unit ordering his senior commanders that he wanted all full time and reserve soldiers to sharpen up their war fighting skills. He was concerned that the army’s combat troops had gone soft because of the focus on peacekeeping missions. It was his foresight that kept Australian soldiers, both regular and reservist, alive on the battlefield in Timor despite the cutbacks from the bureaucrats.

However, the militia refused give up its mission.

On June 14, 2001 a small Australian Army patrol of eight soldiers from 4 Section, 2 Platoon , Alpha Company, 4RAR, lead by Corporal Kevin “Bambi” Campbell, a former SASR trooper, was attacked by militia near the Indonesian border. Bambi’s patrol used the radio call-sign One-Two-Alpha.

Scott Sherwin, is now a family man and tree surgeon living outside Newcastle, New South Wales, and Pete, who suffers from Post Traumatic Syndrome Disorder (PTSD), survives on a military pension in Melbourne’s outer-eastern suburbs.

Both remained silent for years and had bottled up emotions but were now ready to re-examine that fateful day of June 14, 2001.

In the official 4RAR Battalion book on the East Timor mission, the incident was listed as occurring on June 1, 2001. But this was a printing error. The shootout occurred during Operation Predator (June 14-16, 2001), which was a search for militia along the border areas.

The Australian Army newspaper, on August 16, 2001, reported: “On the other hand, there have been several serious incidents. One, as recently as mid June, involved a contact with five armed men and a section from 4RAR.”

At 12.50pm, in a place known as AO Sparrow, One-Two-Alpha came under gunfire and grenade attack from a militia group consisting of five to eight men, believed to be Kopassus. Pete, as a scout, was at the front of the patrol when the shooting erupted.

Scott Sherwin, as the assault machine gunner, was at the rear and had to run forwards to support his comrades. Pete initially saw a local man dressed in a white civilian shirt swinging a machete through the thick vegetation called lantana. It looked quite innocent. Seconds later his patrol was fired upon and everybody hit the ground.

“If the enemy were to fire back, I would be a visible target,” Scott recalled “So I let go of my fears of dying at the time, and just ran and fired.”

But it is this memory which keeps on replaying through Scott’s mind over the years and the thoughts of “what if the militia had fired directly upon him?”As a trained soldier, Scott went into auto-pilot on that day. The army calls it contact drills. Soldiers are taught to react in a certain way when fired upon. It helps to keep fear and confusion to a minimum.

Another troubling idea that raced through Scott’s head was remembering that New Zealand soldier Private Leonard Manning was killed by militia near the town of Suai on July 24, 2000 and his body was later found mutilated.

“I think in the back of our minds we knew that if we were caught behind or captured that we would be killed or we’d be cut up then killed,” Scott said. “So our choices were quite limited.”

It seemed on that date, June 14, 2001, fate was smiling upon the soldiers of One-Two-Alpha when Pete felt the blast of one of the militia grenades, and unbelievably suffered only a scratch and, as he said, “went back to firing”. The main (machine) gunner was thrown back when a grenade landed two metres in front of him and he too got up without injury!

During the contact, three militiamen were believed to have been killed or wounded. The others probably dragged the dead or wounded back across the border into Indonesia.

“They weren’t just locals with guns,” Pete said. “They had some form of military training. They would pepper-pot the way we were trained. That is one soldier fires whilst another moves.”

The SASR was called in to track the withdrawing militia but then, inexplicably, the search was called off. A reconnaissance patrol with a tracker dog two weeks later found trails that led all the way back to the border.

The standard operating procedure (SOP) for the Kopassus/Militia was that if it was involved in a contact with UN peacekeepers, any dead or wounded were to be dragged across the border back into Indonesia. No evidence was to be left behind. The Viet Cong during the Vietnam War also dragged away dead or wounded to deny information to US and Australian troops.

Ugly rumours began to circulate that One-Two-Alpha had staged the contact to hide a UD, unauthorised discharge, that is someone from the patrol had illegally or negligently fired. The Indonesian authorities were claiming that three innocent sandalwood smugglers, without any militia links, had been murdered and were only carrying crow-bars.

“Why you would need crow-bars to cut trees with?” Pete said. “They were the first crow-bars that ever fired shots.” A United Nations investigation was launched and the members of One-Two-Alpha were forbidden to talk about the incident but were later cleared of any wrongdoing.

Bambi Campbell was given a UN Commander’s Commendation certificate but missed out on an Australian Army bravery medal. Likewise Clinton missed out on the Nobel Peace Prize. Sometimes doing the right thing does not mean recognition! More importantly, in 2002 the long suffering East Timor became the newly independent nation of Timor Leste.

(end)

About the Author

Sasha Uzunov is a freelance photo journalist, blogger, and budding film maker whose mission is to return Australia's national defence/ security debate to its rightful owner, the taxpayer. He also likes paparazzi photography! He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Journalism from The Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology in 1991. He served as a professional soldier in the Australian Army from 1995 to 2002, and completed two tours of duty in East Timor. As a journalist he has worked in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. His blog is at Team Uzunov.

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

BYE, BYE BATTALION - 4RAR

Photo: Alpha Company, 4RAR (Cdo), Holsworthy Barracks parade background, marches off to deploy to East Timor in 2001. (Photo by Sasha Uzunov)

BYE, BYE BATTALION
by Sasha "Uzi" Uzunov

A very sad day for those of us who served as non-commando riflemen with Australian army unit, The 4th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment - Commando - 4RAR (Cdo). It will be renamed 2nd Commando Regiment with effect 19 June 2009.

Some of us have fond memories of our service with the unit--based in Sydney's Holsworthy Barracks-- in peacetime and on Active Service in East Timor 2001.

See the Department of Defence media release:

MSPA 183/09 Thursday, 4 June 2009

4 RAR (COMMANDO) TO BECOME THE 2ND COMMANDO REGIMENT

Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, today announced that Army’s 4th Battalion (Commando), the Royal Australian Regiment, (4 RAR Cdo) will be renamed as the 2nd Commando Regiment (2 Cdo Regt) on 19 June 2009.

The decision follows a comprehensive consultation process with current and previous serving members of 4 RAR (Cdo), as well as their families and support associations.

“While there were vast opinions to consider, we accepted the strong desire amongst current serving 4 RAR (Cdo) soldiers to rename the unit and effectively raise 2 Cdo Regt,” Lieutenant General Gillespie said.“The name 2 Cdo Regt more accurately reflects the roles and capabilities of the commandos and their command structure, which are distinct from our conventional infantry battalions.”

Army’s infantry battalions are primarily used to seize and hold territory, where commandos focus on special operations including raids, interdiction of enemy communication lines, seizing points of entry and counter terrorism / hostage rescue.4 RAR began transitioning in 1996 when Government directed Army to establish a second commando regiment with the ability to conduct special recovery and strike operations.

4 RAR (Cdo) is now nearing maturity as a special operations unit, and the name change to 2 Cdo Regt recognises this achievement as well as the skills and qualifications of its members.“Army will continue to honour the contribution the past members of 4 RAR and 4 RAR (Cdo) have made to its rich history, and the unit name will not be lost. 4 RAR will remain on Army’s Order of Battle and may be reinstated in the future, if and when the need arises,” Lieutenant General Gillespie said.

The name 2nd Commando Regiment was chosen as it logically complements the existing 1st Commando Regiment, and also reflects the unit’s historical links to the Australian Independent Commando Companies that operated in the Southwest Pacific in the Second World War.

2nd Commando Regiment will join the Special Air Service Regiment, Incident Response Regiment, 1st Commando Regiment, the Special Forces Training Centre and the Special Operations Logistics Squadron as part of Army’s Special Operations Command.

(end)

Brief History, courtesy of 4RAR Association website

http://www.4rarassociationsaustralia.com/history.html
4th BATTALION, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

Introduction

4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment 4 RAR (Cdo) is a battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment whose roll is Commando. They wear the distinctive Commando Green beret with the badge of the Royal Australian Regiment and the Commando Green parachute wings. They operate however as a Special Forces unit under Special Forces Operational Command.

The Beginning 1964: 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, (4 RAR) also known as “The Fighting Fourth” was raised at Woodside, South Australia on the first of February 1964 and as such was the first Infantry battalion of the Australian Regular Army to be raised on Australian soil.

Malaysia 1965 - 1967: After rigorous training in Australia, some training performed for the first time by any unit, the Battalion relieved 3 RAR as the Australian battalion of the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade located in Malacca in West Malaysia.

Borneo 1966: This was a period of war with Indonesia which was opposed to the newly formed state of Malaysia. After conducting advanced training in West Malaysia, 4 RAR deployed to Borneo in April 1966 for the next five months conducted operations against the Indonesian army. During this time two significant large scale cross border raids by Indonesian forces were neutralised by the Battalion. The Battalion also conducted approximately 12 secret, long range platoon sized patrols deep into Indonesia.The Borneo area of operations was either rugged mountainous jungle or fetid swamp. This difficult terrain and the nature of secret long range patrols into Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) demanded a high standard of patrolling and battlecraft skills that provided excellent operational experience for the Battalion’s subsequent tour of South Vietnam in 1968 to 1969.

4 RAR returned to Australia from Malaysia in October 1967 and was immediately warned for deployment to South Vietnam. The Battalion had only seven months in Australia before beginning its tour in South Vietnam in June 1968.

South Vietnam 1968-1969: On arrival in Vietnam the Battalion was to be reduced to three rifle companies (usually four) and incorporate two companies of the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment and would be known as 4th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment/ New Zealand (ANZAC) or 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC).During the Battalion’s twelve months tour of South Vietnam during 1968 and 1969, it took part in 11 major operations and spent a total of 270 days in the field operating as a battalion, in addition to five major company sized operations and many smaller operations. As a result of some 90 contacts with the enemy, the Battalion lost 19 men killed in action and 84 wounded in action. It accounted for more than 300 enemy dead.

After this tour, the Battalion returned to Brisbane in June 1969 and prepared for a further tour of South Vietnam in 1971.

South Vietnam 1971-1972: In May 1971, 4RAR, again as an ANZAC Battalion, began operations only a week after arriving in South Vietnam. The Battalion actually remained in the field for the next seven and a half months. From June to December 1971, when the battalion was continuously engaged in patrolling, ambushing and attacking enemy bunker positions. During this period the Battalion conducted nine major operations. This included the major battle of Nui Le on the twenty first of September 1971,when D Company fought a fierce battle against two battalions and the Regimental Headquarters of the 33rd Regiment of the North Vietnam Army. After the battle, the last major engagement by Australian forces in South Vietnam, the 33rd Regiment removed itself from Phouc Tuy Province and never operated as a unit again.In December 1971, most of the Battalion returned to Townsville, Queensland. D Company remained behind until March 1972 to protect the remainder of the Australians prior to the withdrawal of all Australian troops from South Vietnam as a result of the North Vietnamese signing a peace treaty.During this second tour of South Vietnam, the Battalion suffered nine soldiers killed in action and thirty eight wounded in action. The Battalion accounted for ninety one enemy dead but it is highly probable that a further significant number of enemy were killed or wounded in the battle of Nui Le.

2/4 RAR 1973 - 1995: In 1973, the 4th Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment were linked together to form the Second/Fourth Battalion or 2/4 RAR. This was because after Vietnam, the Army went through a major reduction in personnel. The Royal Australian Regiment was reduced from nine battalions to five and several battalions were linked together.Although 2/4 RAR did not deploy overseas as a battalion during this period, many individuals from the battalion served overseas in peace-keeping rolls in Cambodia in 1993, Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.

4 RAR Re-raised 1995: On the First of February 1995, the 2nd Battalion and the 4th Battalion were separated and 4RAR was re-raised, 31 years after it was originally raised. The Fighting Fourth took up its new home at Holsworthy, NSW.

4 RAR (Cdo) 1997: On the first of February 1997, 4RAR was converted to a Special Forces Commando unit and renamed 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando) or 4 RAR (Cdo).The first four years as a commando battalion kept the Fighting Fourth very busy training soldiers for its Special Forces role. At the same time it was tasked in a counter terrorist role for the Sydney Olympic Games.

East Timor 1999: In September 1999, a small team from 4 RAR (Cdo) were sent to East Timor and were involved mainly in VIP protection.

East Timor 2001: From April to October 2001, the Battalion deployed to East Timor, now officially named Timor Leste after gaining independence on 20 May 2002, where it again opposed Indonesians who attempted to interfere with the emergence of East Timor as an independent country after it broke away from Indonesia.

Counter Terrorist Training 2002 - 2003: After returning from East Timor in October 2001, the Battalion commenced intensive training to meet its Special Forces and Counter Terrorist capabilities.

Iraq 2003 - 2006: In February 2003, a 4 RAR (Cdo) company group was included in the Australian force deployed to support the Coalition forces during the second Gulf War.This was the first time that the Battalion had deployed a force on operations to undertake commando specific tasks such as Combat Search and Rescue and support to Special Air Service operations. 4 RAR (Cdo) remained in Iraq until 2007.

Afghanistan 2006: In 2006, a large 4 RAR (Cdo) element deployed on operations into Afghanistan as part of the Australian Special Operations Task Group. Much of the battalion’s operations in Afghanistan is still subject to security restrictions, but the Battalion has been involved in some fierce fighting. After one such action described as the fiercest action since the battle of Nui Le in South Vietnam, a sergeant was subsequently awarded the Star of Gallantry and a corporal was awarded the Medal for Gallantry. 4 RAR (Cdo) was awarded the Unit Citation for Gallantry and the 4RAR (Cdo) members who made up the Special Operations Task Group were awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation.

East Timor 2006: 2006 also saw the return of elements of 4 RAR (Cdo) to East Timor where they remained until 2007.

Australia 2006: 4 RAR (Cdo) now provides a long standing counter terrorist capability with the emphasis on rapid response, within eastern Australia.

Afghanistan 2007: 4 RAR (Cdo) was again warned for operations in Afghanistan and departed for Afghanistan in mid May 2007.Summary4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando) is the Australian Army’s first regular commando unit, capable of undertaking large scale offensive, support and recovery operations beyond the scope and capability of other Australian Defence Force units.

4RAR (Cdo) today spans the divide between conventional and unconventional operations, providing the Australian Defence Force with a highly effective and flexible capability in times of crisis. It is now regarded as the best Commando unit in the world.

4 RAR (Cdo) is made up of approximately 800 men including Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force personnel but 800 men do not make a battalion. The 800 men have to learn the soldiers’ trade and disciplines. Even then they are not a battalion. An effective battalion, ready to fight implies a state of mind, a state of grace and a state of duty. It implies that it is possible to say, ‘the battalion thinks’ or ‘the battalion feels’ and this is not an exaggeration.

4 RAR (Cdo) is definitely a battalion in this sense and always was. It is not an exaggeration to say that 4RAR (Cdo) is regarded by friend and foe alike as the best of the best. They live and fight by the motto of The Royal Australian Regiment . . . . . . DUTY FIRST